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Abstract
An established result of the endogenous growth literature is that competitive equilibria
in expanding-varieties models are suboptimal due to the rent-e⁄ect: monopolistic pricing
drives the equilibrium quantity of each intermediate below the e¢ cient level, implying
that it is optimal to subsidize ￿nal producers. This paper shows that, if scale e⁄ects
are eliminated by including R&D spillovers in the model, normative prescriptions change.
Since the laissez-faire economy under-invests into R&D activity, the share of resources
devoted to intermediates￿production increases, and this reallocation e⁄ect contrasts the
rent-e⁄ect. In many scenarios, including the polar case of logarithmic preferences, the
reallocation e⁄ect surely dominates: the equilibrium quantity of each intermediate exceeds
the optimal one, and the optimal policy consists of taxing ￿nal producers because ￿scal
authorities must internalize the overshooting mechanism generated by under-investment
in R&D.
Keywords Endogenous Growth, Scale E⁄ects, R&D Externalities, Optimal Policy.
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11 Introduction
An important strand of the endogenous growth literature emphasizes the role of R&D activity
as a crucial source of sustained economic development. In this framework, horizontal (vertical)
innovations improve the quantity (quality) of intermediate inputs, and productivity growth
results from endogenous technical change. After the seminal contributions of Romer (1987;
1990), most models of R&D-based growth share a typical structure comprising three core sec-
tors: ￿nal producers, usually assumed to be perfectly competitive and acting as price-takers; a
￿nite mass of monopolistic ￿rms producing di⁄erentiated intermediates; and an R&D sector,
developing blueprints of new types of intermediates to be exploited by incumbent monopolists.
In this framework, the role of monopolistic competition is relevant in two respects. On the
one hand, the possibility of earning monopoly rents represents a crucial incentive to inno-
vate. On the other hand, monopolistic markets generate ine¢ cient allocations in competitive
equilibria under laissez-faire conditions. The second characteristic implies that decentralizing
e¢ cient and socially-optimal paths in these market economies requires active public interven-
tion. In order to obtain a positive mark-up, monopolists restrict supply, and the equilibrium
quantity of each intermediate employed in ￿nal production is ine¢ ciently low. This is a stan-
dard rent-e⁄ect, which implies that restoring e¢ ciency requires subsidizing the purchases of
intermediates of ￿nal producers.
The optimality of subsidies to ￿nal producers has been established in various contexts. Two
useful references are the lab-equipment models with expanding-varieties presented in Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (2004: p.285-300) and in Acemoglu (2009: p.433-444) - respectively based
on Romer (1990) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). One aspect that appears neglected,
however, is the robustness of this result to alternative speci￿cations of the R&D technology
that drives economic growth. In Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) and Acemoglu (2009), the
optimality of subsidies to ￿nal producers is formally proved under the assumption that the
instantaneous increase in the number of varieties of intermediate products is in ￿xed proportion
with the absolute level of R&D expenditures. This characteristic, however, implies that the
model displays pure scale e⁄ects: the equilibrium growth rate is proportional to the number of
workers employed in ￿nal production - which coincides with population size. For this reason,
we will henceforth label this framework as the Multi-sector Scale Model (MS-model).
The presence of scale e⁄ects in endogenous growth models has been criticized on empirical
grounds (e.g. Backus et al. 1992), and the subsequent literature showed that scale e⁄ects
can be eliminated by means of alternative assumptions.1 A ￿rst approach is that followed by
semi-endogenous growth models (Jones, 1995; Kortum, 1997; Segerstrom, 1998), postulating
a non-linear relation between the growth rate of the mass of varieties and the employment
level in the R&D sector. In this case, population size only has scale e⁄ects on aggregate
income levels. A second class of models, developed by Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998),
Peretto (1998) and Young (1998), assumes that research can increase either productivity
within a product line or the total number of available products. The mixed dimension of
horizontal and vertical innovations implies that the market structure can absorb scale e⁄ects
- e.g. because the increase in the number of ￿rms makes each ￿rm more specialized, and the
higher technological distance reduces the spillovers among ￿rms (Peretto and Smulders, 2002).
A third way to eliminate scale e⁄ects is to extend the MS-model by including a linear relation
between the growth rate of intermediates￿varieties and the rate of R&D investment, measured
1See Jones (1999) for a detailed discussion.
2by the ratio between R&D expenditures and aggregate output. For expositional clarity, we
will henceforth refer to this assumption as the linear-rate law. This solution is mentioned in
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004: p.300-302), and features two desirable properties. On the one
hand, it eliminates scale e⁄ects since the economy￿ s growth rate depends on the population
growth rate but not on population size. On the other hand, it is consistent with the empirical
observation that productivity growth appears positively related to the ratio between R&D
expenditures and output with a relatively stable coe¢ cient.
Focusing on the third approach, it may be stressed that the existing literature does not
provide a detailed discussion of optimal policies in the presence of linear-rate laws. However,
depending on the way in which the linear-rate law is introduced in the model, the welfare
properties of the laissez-faire equilibrium are substantially modi￿ed. In particular, if the
structural assumptions of the MS-model are maintained, the linear-rate law has to be recon-
ciled with zero-pro￿t conditions in the R&D sector, which suggests introducing externalities
in R&D activity. This assumption is conceptually similar to that underlying the analysis of
Lucas (1988), where human capital drives growth but does not imply scale e⁄ects because the
productivity of individual knowledge depends on the average human capital in the society. In
the multi-sector framework with expanding varieties, an analogous speci￿cation is that the
marginal productivity of R&D expenditures - taken as given at the ￿rm level - increases with
the state of technology determined by previous R&D e⁄orts. If the productivity of current
research is positively a⁄ected by the results of past research, a linear accumulation law may
arise at the aggregate level. Given the presence of externalities, the welfare properties of the
competitive equilibrium di⁄er from those predicted by the MS-model. The aim of this paper is
to analyze the policy implications of the interplay between the rent-e⁄ect and the linear-rate
law generated by R&D spillovers.2 To this aim, we study a Linear-Rate Model which main-
tains all the assumptions of the benchmark MS-model, except for the presence of externalities
in the R&D technology.
The present analysis yields three main results. First, the general structure of the Linear-
Rate model implies that laissez-faire equilibria exhibit a peculiar reallocation e⁄ect with re-
spect to socially-optimal allocations. On the one hand, the competitive economy under-invests
in R&D activity, which is not surprising: since private agents do not fully internalize the posi-
tive side-e⁄ects of current research on future productivity growth, R&D activity is ine¢ ciently
low. On the other hand, this misallocation of resources has a peculiar consequence: a low
fraction of output invested in R&D activity implies a greater share directed towards the pro-
duction of intermediates. Since this mechanism tends to raise the equilibrium quantity of each
intermediate input, the reallocation e⁄ect contrasts the rent-e⁄ect mentioned above. More
precisely: in the competitive laissez-faire economy of the Linear-Rate model, the equilibrium
quantity of each intermediate tends to be reduced by monopolistic pricing but, at the same
time, tends to be increased by the misallocation of resources in disfavor of R&D activity.
The question that naturally arises is which of the two e⁄ects dominates. In this regard,
our second result is that, in the polar case with logarithmic preferences, the reallocation e⁄ect
always dominates, generating overshooting in intermediates￿production. This result is in
2For reasons of expositional clarity, the present analysis follows the standard speci￿cation of the lab-
equipment model with Cobb-Douglas technology. When R&D spillovers are sector-speci￿c and technologies
exhibit a substitution elasticity di⁄erent from unity, the stability and existence properties of equilibrium paths
may be altered substantially, as shown in Doi and Mino (2005). Addressing these issues is however beyond the
scope of the present analysis, which focuses on the optimal taxation of ￿nal producers.
3contrast with the predictions of the MS-model, where the (i) rent-e⁄ect is the only market
failure, (ii) equilibrium quantities of intermediates are ine¢ ciently low, and (iii) restoring
e¢ ciency requires subsidizing ￿nal producers. The Linear-Rate model analyzed here, instead,
establishes that with unit-elasticity preferences, the optimal policy consists of taxing ￿nal
producers because ￿scal authorities must internalize the overshooting e⁄ect on intermediates￿
production generated by the under-investment in R&D activity.
The third result of the analysis relates to the robustness of the overshooting e⁄ect and of
the associated normative prescription. Relaxing the assumption of logarithmic preferences,
it is shown that the reallocation e⁄ect arising in the laissez-faire economy is strengthened
(weakened) by higher (lower) values of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, denoted
by 1=￿. In particular, the reallocation e⁄ect surely dominates if the elasticity is above or
equal to unity: when ￿ ￿ 1, the overshooting result is reinforced and the optimal tax on
￿nal producers is strictly positive. When ￿ > 1, instead, it possible that the elasticity of
substitution overcomes a critical threshold whereby the reallocation e⁄ect is very weak and
dominated by the rent-e⁄ect. In this case, intermediates￿production is ine¢ ciently low and
the ￿nal sector should be subsidized - although the optimal subsidy rate will be generally
smaller than that predicted by the MS-model.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the linear-rate law in the bench-
mark model with expanding varieties. Section 3 analyzes competitive equilibria with and
without public intervention. Section 4 derives the socially-optimal allocation by solving a
standard centralized problem, and clari￿es the di⁄erences between the market failures arising
in the present model relative to the MS-model. Section 5 derives the main results, and Section
6 concludes.
2 The Competitive Economy
In order to facilitate the comparison with the MS-model, our set-up follows closely the most
popular version of the lab-equipment model. In particular, the market structure and the
assumptions regarding ￿rms and households behavior, described in section 2.1, are identical
to those made in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004: p.285-300) and Acemoglu (2009: p.433-
444). The analysis di⁄ers in the speci￿cation of the dynamic law governing the growth rate
of intermediates￿varieties: this modi￿cation is introduced in section 2.2. In order to discuss
optimal policies, the competitive economy also includes a ￿scal authority that subsidizes R&D
investment and may tax or subsidize the purchase of intermediate inputs by ￿nal producers.
The laissez-faire equilibrium is obtained as a special case of this more general competitive
equilibrium. For the sake of comparability, we initially assume that ￿nal producers￿purchases
of inputs are subsidized at rate b: the normative prediction of the MS-model is that the ￿nal
sector should be subsidized due to the rent-e⁄ect, so that the optimal subsidy rate is b￿ > 0.
The present analysis will show that in the Linear-Rate model, instead, ￿nal producers should
be taxed in several circumstances, so that the optimal subsidy rate b￿ may well be strictly
negative.
2.1 Firms and Households Behavior
Final Sector. Output consists of a single consumption good produced under constant returns
to scale. The whole sector can be thus represented as a single competitive ￿rm producing
4output by means of J varieties of di⁄erentiated intermediate products, indexed by j 2 [0;J],
and labor. The technology is





￿ dj; ￿ 2 (0;1); (1)
where t 2 [0;1) is the time index, Y (t) is the quantity of output, L(t) is the number of
workers and x(j;t) is the quantity of the j-th variety of intermediate input employed (and
destroyed) in production. The mass of varieties at time zero is given, J (0) = J0 > 0, and
may increase over time due to R&D activity that provides endogenous technological progress
in the form of varieties expansion. Each household supplies one unit of labor inelastically, so
that L(t) equals population size. Denoting by ‘ > 0 the constant population growth rate, we
have L(t) = L0e‘t. The government subsidizes the purchase of each intermediate good b(j;t):
in order to focus on symmetric equilibria, we set a constant subsidy rate for each variety
b(j;t) = b, which may be positive or negative. Denoting the wage rate by w(t) and the price
of the j-th intermediate by p(j;t), the pro￿t-maximizing conditions imply
w(t) = (1 ￿ ￿)Y (t)=L(t); (2)
p(j;t) = b + ￿L(t)
1￿￿ x(j;t)
￿￿1 : (3)
Each variety of intermediate input is produced by a monopolist who holds the relevant patent.
As a consequence, the demand schedule (3) is taken as given by each intermediate producer.
Intermediate Sector. The j-th monopolist maximizes instantaneous pro￿ts
￿ (j;t) = p(j;t)x(j;t) ￿ ￿x(j;t)
subject to (3), where ￿ is a constant marginal cost applying to each variety. The ￿rst-order
conditions yield the pricing rule
p(j;t) =
￿ ￿ b(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(4)
for each j 2 [0;J], implying that pro￿ts and produced quantities are symmetric across varieties:





￿ (j;t) = ￿ (t) =
(￿ ￿ b)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
x(t): (6)





1￿￿ L(t)J (t); (7)
which shows that output is linear in the number of varieties of intermediate products as well
as in population size.
R&D Sector. The mass of monopolistic ￿rms increases over time by virtue of R&D activ-
ity pursued by competitive ￿rms. In each instant t, the number of varieties of intermediate
products increases as R&D ￿rms develop new blueprints and sell the relevant patent to an
5incumbent monopolist. The symmetric equilibrium in the monopolistic sector allows us to
represent R&D ￿rms as a consolidated R&D sector earning zero pro￿ts due to perfect compe-
tition and free-entry. Developing blueprints requires R&D investment and, in the aggregate,
the innovation frontier is represented by the linear technology
_ J (t) = ￿(t)Z (t); (8)
where Z (t) is aggregate R&D expenditure in the economy, and ￿(t) is the marginal pro-
ductivity of investment, taken as given at the ￿rm level. Each R&D ￿rm receives a subsidy
to investment at constant rate a > 0, so that aggregate R&D expenditure consists of total
expenditure of ￿rms, denoted by z (t), plus total government spending az (t). We thus have
Z (t) = z (t)(1 + a). Denoting by V (t) the value of each patent, the zero-pro￿t condition is3
V (t) = 1=[￿(t)(1 + a)]: (9)
The value of each patent sold to an incumbent producer equals the present value of future








where i(t) is the equilibrium interest rate yielded by private investment.
Government. The public sector ￿nances total expenditures by means of a lump-sum tax
f (t) imposed on each household. Ruling out public debt, we set
az (t) + bJ (t)x(t) = f (t)L(t) (11)
in order to have balanced budget in each instant.
Households. The economy is populated by L(t) identical households. Individual private
wealth consists of a fraction 1=L(t) of the N (t) total assets in the economy, representing
shares of owned ￿rms. Denoting assets per capita by n(t) ￿ N (t)=L(t), the individual
wealth constraint reads
_ n(t) = (i(t) ￿ ‘)n(t) + w(t) ￿ c(t) ￿ f (t); (12)
where c(t) is individual consumption. The objective of the representative agent born in instant











where ￿ > 0 is the time-preference rate, and u(c) is the iso-elastic instantaneous utility
function with ￿ > 0. As shown in the Appendix, the maximization of Ut subject to (12)









0 i(s)ds = 0; (14)
3Aggregate pro￿ts of the R&D sector equal V (t) _ J (t)￿Z (t) = V (t)￿ (t)z (t)(1 + a)￿z (t), so that condition
(9) maximizes R&D pro￿ts for a given marginal productivity ￿ (t), and implies zero pro￿ts for each ￿rm. The
same condition is equivalently obtained assuming free entry in the R&D business for an inde￿nite number of
￿rms, as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004: Ch.6).
6and the ￿rst-order conditions yield the usual Keynes-Ramsey rule _ c(t)=c(t) = ￿￿1 (i(t) ￿ ￿ ￿ ‘).






[i(t) ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)‘]; (15)
where C (t) ￿ L(t)c(t) is aggregate consumption. Since the total value of assets in the
economy equals the value of ￿rms, L(t)n(t) = J (t)V (t), equation (12) and the previous
relations imply the aggregate constraint of the economy (see Appendix)
Y (t) = C (t) + Z (t) + ￿J (t)x(t); (16)
which shows that total output equals aggregate consumption plus total R&D expenditures
plus the cost of producing intermediates in each instant.
2.2 Spillovers in the R&D sector
All the assumptions reported in section 2.1 coincide with those made in Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004: p.285-300) and Acemoglu (2009: p.433-444). The distinction between the Multi-
sector Scale Model and the Linear-Rate Model is exclusively based on di⁄erent speci￿cations
of the marginal productivity of investment - that is ￿(t) in equation (8) - which is taken as
given at the ￿rm level.
If we set ￿(t) equal to an exogenous constant, say ￿ > 0, we obtain the MS-model. In this
case, the free-entry condition imposes that the patent value equals the true net cost of R&D,
and the mass of varieties is in ￿xed proportion with R&D expenditure:
_ J (t) = ￿Z (t):
In this paper, we specify a di⁄erent innovation frontier. Suppose that the marginal productiv-
ity of investment ￿(t) is a⁄ected by spillovers whereby the productivity of past research e⁄orts
increases that of current activity. In the modern growth literature, this type of spillovers are
usually formalized as knowledge-stock externalities. For example, models with human capital
￿ la Lucas (1988) incorporate an un-compensated transmission of human capital across gen-
erations induced by public knowledge. The equivalent assumption in the present context is
that the R&D activity of each ￿rm is more productive the better the ￿ current state of technol-
ogy attained by virtue of previous research￿ . This concept of state-of-the-art in research can
be conveniently measured by the ratio between the number of existing varieties and current
output levels, J (t)=Y (t). Formally, we set
￿(t) ￿ ￿ ￿ J (t)=Y (t) (17)
where ￿ > 0 is a constant proportionality factor representing the intensity of the external-
ity. Equation (17) implies that the growth rate of intermediates￿varieties increases with the
economy-wide rate of R&D investment: from (8), we have
_ J (t)=J (t) = ￿ ￿ (Z (t)=Y (t)): (18)
Following the de￿nitions given in the Introduction, equation (18) is a linear-rate law. As
mentioned in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004: p.300-302), linear-rate laws like (18) generally
7exhibit two desirable properties. First, they eliminate scale e⁄ects by making the equilibrium
growth rate of output independent of the population size. Second, they ￿t the data better
than the MS-model since, in most industrialized countries, the growth rate of productivity
appears to be positively related to the ratio between R&D expenditures and output, with a
proportionality coe¢ cient - here represented by ￿ - that is relatively stable over time. The
following analysis will show that there exists a third, welfare-related implication. When the
linear law (18) is obtained by postulating spillover e⁄ects in the R&D sector - as we do in
(17) - there exists a reallocation e⁄ect whereby a competitive economy under laissez-faire
may overproduce each intermediate input as a result of sub-optimal R&D investment. To my
knowledge, this point has not been stressed in the literature so far, but it is relevant from a
policy-making perspective: despite the fact that intermediate inputs yield positive monopoly
rents, the equilibrium quantity sold on the market may exceed the socially-optimal level. If
this is the case, restoring e¢ ciency requires taxing, and not subsidizing, ￿nal producers - a
result that is in contrast with the predictions of the MS-model.
The remainder of the analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we characterize the compet-
itive equilibrium. Second, we identify the socially-optimal allocation with the solution of a
standard centralized problem. Third, we characterize the optimal policy by deriving the levels
of the subsidy rates that decentralize the optimum in the competitive economy with public
intervention. The following sections analyze each point in turn.
3 Competitive Equilibrium
3.1 General Characteristics
The equilibrium quantities in the competitive economy will be denoted by superscript ￿ E￿ . As
shown in the Appendix, the equilibrium is characterized by a constant rate of return to R&D
activity, and therefore by balanced growth in each point in time:
Proposition 1 In the competitive equilibrium, the consumption propensity ￿E ￿ CE=Y E,
the investment rate  E ￿ ZE=Y E, and the interest rate iE are constant over time, and equal
to










[(1 + a)￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿=￿)]; (20)
iE = ￿(1 + a)￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ‘: (21)












[￿(1 + a)￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿‘ ￿ ￿]; (22)
_ JE (t)
JE (t)
= ￿ E =
1
￿
[￿(1 + a)￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿]: (23)
in each t 2 [0;1). (Proof: see Appendix)
8The absence of transitional dynamics hinges on the same mechanism of the MS-model:
from (7), equilibrium output is linear in the growth rate of varieties. Di⁄erently from the
MS-model, however, there are no scale e⁄ects: from (22), the equilibrium growth rate is not
a⁄ected by population size L(t), but only depends on the population growth rate ‘. Expression
(21) shows that the equilibrium rate of return increases with the spillover parameter ￿ - which
determines the productivity of R&D expenditures - and with the associated subsidy rate a.
The subsidy on the purchases of intermediate inputs, instead, does not yield growth e⁄ects: an
increase in b decreases the consumption propensity (19), but does not modify expressions (20)-
(23). The main role of this subsidy is to raise the equilibrium quantity of each intermediate






On the basis of the above results, the laissez-faire equilibrium can be characterized as follows.
3.2 Laissez-Faire Equilibrium
Ruling out public intervention, consider the competitive economy previously described without
taxes and subsidies, and set a = b = f (t) = 0 in each instant. Denoting the equilibrium
quantities under laissez-faire by superscript ￿ F￿ , Proposition 1 implies that the consumption
propensity ￿F ￿ CF=Y F, the investment rate  F ￿ ZF=Y F, and the interest rate iF are
constant over time, and equal to
￿F = 1 ￿ ￿2 ￿
1
￿




[￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿=￿)]; (26)
iF = ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ‘; (27)












[￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿‘ ￿ ￿]; (28)
_ JF (t)
JF (t)
= ￿ F =
1
￿
[￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿]: (29)







As regards the existence of the equilibrium, there are standard restrictions to be imposed on
parameters. In particular, the equilibrium is well-de￿ned if and only if parameters satisfy
￿ < ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿); (31)
since otherwise the investment rate would be non-positive.4
4If ￿ > ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿), equation (26) implies a negative investment rate  
F 6 0 and equation (29) yields a
negative growth rate of varieties ￿ 
F 6 0.
9As noted before, the laissez-faire equilibrium is ine¢ cient due to two independent reasons.
First, monopolistic competition in the intermediate sector introduces a wedge between the
price and the marginal cost of di⁄erentiated inputs. Second, spillovers in R&D activity are
not internalized by atomistic agents. The interplay between the two market failures implies
that the allocation achieved by the laissez-faire economy di⁄ers from the socially-optimal one,
i.e. the allocation that would be chosen by a benevolent utilitarian planner endowed with
perfect foresight. The social optimum is brie￿ y described below.
4 Social Optimality
4.1 The Centralized Problem
Consider the social problem solved by a hypothetical central planner endowed with perfect












where the instantaneous welfare function is the sum the utilities of all households in each point
in time, and the social discount rate (￿ + ‘) embodies the necessary adjustment for population
growth. The maximization is subject to the aggregate constraints of the economy studied in
the previous section, which can be written as









_ J (t) = J (t)￿  (t): (34)
Equation (33) is the aggregate constraint (16), where we have substituted the investment rate
  (t) ￿ Z (t)=Y (t) and technology (1): aggregate consumption equals the un-invested fraction
of output minus the total cost of producing intermediates. Equation (34) is the dynamic law
governing varieties￿expansion (18): the use of this constraint implicitly postulates that the
existence of R&D spillovers is known to the planner. The social planner chooses the sequence
of consumption, quantities of intermediates and investment rates using fc(t);x(j;t);’(t)g
1
t=0
as control variables. The number of varieties J (t) and the resource stock S (t) act as state
variables, with given initial endowments S0 > 0 and J0 > 0. As shown in the Appendix,
the optimality conditions imply balanced growth from time zero onwards. Denoting optimal
quantities by superscript ￿ ?￿ , we have the following
Proposition 2 In the social optimum, the consumption propensity ￿? ￿ C?=Y ? and the








[1 ￿ (￿=￿)]: (36)












(￿ + ￿‘ ￿ ￿) (37)
_ J? (t)
J? (t)
= ￿ ? =
1
￿
(￿ ￿ ￿): (38)
in each t 2 [0;1). (Proof: see Appendix)
The existence of the optimal path hinges on restrictions that are already satis￿ed if a
well-de￿ned laissez-faire equilibrium exists. For example, a positive optimal investment rate
requires ￿ > ￿, which is already satis￿ed if (31) holds.
The centralized allocation chosen by the social planner di⁄ers from the laissez-faire compet-
itive equilibrium in two respects. First, comparing Proposition 2 with expressions (25)-(29),
it follows that the optimal growth rate di⁄ers from the laissez-faire growth rate in (28). The
growth gap is in favor of the centralized economy, and equals
_ Y ? (t)
Y ? (t)
￿
_ Y F (t)
Y F (t)
= ￿[1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)] > 0: (39)
This result is intuitive: since the social planner internalizes the externality contained in ￿(t),
the competitive interest rate iF falls short of the social return to R&D.5 As a consequence,
the laissez-faire economy under-invests into R&D activity: from (26) and (36), the optimal
investment rate  ? is higher than the laissez-faire rate  F.
The second asymmetry between the social optimum and the competitive economy is that
the optimal quantity of each intermediate product generally di⁄ers from the equilibrium quan-
tity sold to ￿nal producers by monopolists under laissez-faire conditions. As shown in the
























In general, whether the right hand side of (41) is above or below unity depends on the whole
set of parameters. This ambiguity does not arise in the MS-model, where the equilibrium
quantities are always below the optimal level. The root of this di⁄erence in results is that, in
the present model, the combination of monopolistic pricing and R&D spillovers gives rise to
two contrasting e⁄ects, as clari￿ed below.





? ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)‘], where i
? is the implicit rate of return in the centralized economy. From (37), the implicit
rate of return in the optimum is i
? = ￿+‘. From (27) the di⁄erence between social and private rates of return
under laissez-faire, i
? ￿ i
F, is strictly positive and equal to the right hand side of (39).
114.2 Rent-E⁄ect and Reallocation
The reason for the ambiguous sign in the gap x? ￿ xF is as follows. On the one hand, the
equilibrium quantity of each intermediate tends to be reduced relative to the optimum due
to the rent-e⁄ect: monopolistic behavior in the intermediate sector implies a positive mark-
up between prices and marginal costs; this restricts supply and thereby the quantity of each
intermediate employed in production - a phenomenon that also arises in the MS-model. On
the other hand, di⁄erently from the MS-model, the competitive economy tends to under-invest
into R&D activity due to externalities in research: private agents fail to recognize the linear
relation between investment rates and growth rates of varieties - i.e. equation (18) - and this
implies that ZF=Y F is ine¢ ciently low. While this misallocation of resources goes to the
detriment of R&D investment, there is a greater share of output available for consumption
and for producing intermediates. Hence, the reallocation e⁄ect of under-investment in R&D
tends to raise the equilibrium quantity of each intermediate. It follows that, if the rent-e⁄ect
dominates, we have xF < x?, as in the MS-model. If the reallocation e⁄ect dominates, instead,
there is overshooting in the intermediate sector of the laissez-faire economy: xF exceeds the
optimal level x?.
Before addressing the question of which e⁄ect dominates, it is instructive to show formally
that the above interpretation is correct. Let us brie￿ y compare the determination of optimal
and equilibrium quantities of intermediates in the MS-model and in the Linear-Rate model.
Since all the assumptions of section 2.1 hold in both frameworks, the laissez-faire equilibrium
condition on x(j) is the same: the marginal productivity of the intermediate equals the









for each j 2 [0;J]: (42)
Now consider the di⁄erent social problems that characterize the two models. As shown in
section 2.2, the MS-model assumes _ J (t) = ￿Z (t). Plugging in this expression the aggregate













Equation (43) is the dynamic constraint of the social problem in the MS-model (cf. Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 2004: p.298). It is immediately apparent that, maximizing (32) subject to
(43), the ￿rst-order condition with respect to x(j) implies
@Y MS (t)
@xMS (j;t)
= " for each j 2 [0;J]; (44)
where the superscript ￿ MS￿indicates optimal quantities in the Multi-sector Scale Model. Equa-
tion (44) is the standard e¢ ciency condition that would arise if intermediates were produced
by perfectly competitive ￿rms. Comparing (44) with (42), it follows that the MS-model only
exhibits the rent-e⁄ect: under laissez-faire, equilibrium quantities tend to be unambiguously
lower than in the optimum due to monopolistic pricing. This is the reason why ￿nal producers
should be subsidized in the MS-model. Also, notice that (44) is a static e¢ ciency condition
6Equation (42) is an intermediate step of the derivation of (5) in section 2.1.
12because the planner optimizes the absolute level of R&D investment, Z (t), in each point in
time.
Results change in our Linear-Rate model because the planner, in view of the di⁄erent
accumulation law _ J (t)=J (t) = ￿Z (t)=Y (t), optimizes the rate of R&D investment   (t), not
the absolute level. Maximizing (32) subject to (33)-(34), the ￿rst-order condition with respect
to x(j) becomes7
(1 ￿  ? (t))
@Y ? (t)
@x? (j;t)
= ￿ for each j 2 [0;J]; (45)
which clearly di⁄ers from (44) due to the presence of the investment rate. Condition (45)
shows that, when the growth rate of varieties obeys the linear-rate law (18), each intermediate
input should be produced up to the point where its marginal cost equals the un-invested
fraction of its marginal product. The interpretation is: if private agents recognized the role
of the investment rate   (t) in enhancing future consumption possibilities, they would restrict
the fraction of output devoted to producing intermediates and set x(j) below the quantity
that equates the current marginal productivity, @Y=@x(j), to the current production cost,
￿. Since this internalization does not take place in the competitive laissez-faire economy, the
equilibrium quantity xLF (j) in the Linear-Rate model tends to be increased by the presence
of R&D externalities. The bottom-line is that, in the Linear-Rate model, xLF (j) is generally
sub-optimal for two independent reasons: the rent-e⁄ect and the reallocation e⁄ect. The fact
that these mechanisms push in opposite directions is immediately evident from (42) and (45):








1 ￿  ?;
where the right hand side determines whether xLF R x?. Indeed, by (36), the term ￿ (1 ￿  ?)
￿1
coincides with the term in square brackets in (41). Since this term may be above or below
unity, the laissez-faire quantity xLF may exceed or fall short of the optimal quantity x?. It
must be stressed, however, that the gap xLF ￿ x? has unambiguous sign in the polar case of
logarithmic preferences, as shown in the next section.
5 Optimal Policy
We have shown that the interplay between monopolistic pricing and R&D externalities gen-
erates contrasting e⁄ects on the equilibrium quantity of intermediate inputs. The question
that naturally arises is which of the two e⁄ects is stronger. If the rent-e⁄ect dominates, we
have x?=xF > 1, and the general policy prescription is similar to that of the MS-model: the
equilibrium quantity of intermediates is ine¢ ciently low, and the optimal policy consists of
subsidizing ￿nal producers in order to restore e¢ ciency. Instead, if the reallocation e⁄ect
dominates, we have x?=xF < 1, and the policy prescription is reversed: due to externalities in
research, the equilibrium quantity of intermediates is ine¢ ciently high, and the optimal policy
consists of taxing ￿nal producers in order to restrict the output share devoted to intermediates￿
production, freeing resources to be invested into R&D activity.
7See the derivation of (A11) in the Appendix.
13For the sake of exposition, the relative magnitude of the rent-e⁄ect and the reallocation
e⁄ect is ￿rstly analyzed in the polar case of logarithmic preferences, which substantially sim-
pli￿es the analysis. The interesting result is that, letting ￿ = 1, the reallocation e⁄ect always
dominates. In the more general case ￿ 6= 1, there exists a critical value ￿ ￿ > 1 below which
the same result holds. Consequently, the rent-e⁄ect may (but does not necessarily) dominate
only if ￿ exceeds unity,.
5.1 Logarithmic Preferences and Optimal Policy
Suppose that preferences are logarithmic. From (25)-(26), setting ￿ = 1 implies that the
laissez-faire equilibrium exhibits ￿F = 1 ￿ ￿ + (￿=￿) and  F = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿=￿). The
equilibrium exists provided that ￿F < 1, which requires that parameters satisfy8
￿=￿ < ￿: (46)
When ￿ = 1, expression (41) reduces x? (t)=xF (t) = [￿=(￿￿)]
1
1￿￿. In view of the feasibility
condition (46), it follows that x? (t) < xF (t). Hence, logarithmic preferences imply that
the reallocation e⁄ect dominates: the socially-optimal quantity of each intermediate input is
lower than the equilibrium quantity attained under laissez-faire. This implies that, contrary
to the prediction of the MS-model, the optimal policy consists of taxing ￿nal producers. More
precisely, de￿ne the optimal policy as the set of instruments (a￿;b￿;f￿ (t)) which decentralizes
the optimal allocation - described by (35)-(40) - in the competitive economy with public
intervention - described by (19)-(24). The comparison between Propositions 1 and 2 yields
the following result:






The optimal subsidy to R&D investment is strictly positive, and equal to
a￿ =
1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
> 0 (48)
(Proof: see Appendix).
As noted before, the fact that R&D activity must be subsidized is not surprising. The
novel result of Proposition 3 is the fact that the purchase of intermediate goods by ￿nal
producers must be taxed, not subsidized. Since ￿ = 1 is commonly regarded as the polar case
in theoretical optimization models, these results suggest that the reallocation e⁄ect dominates
in a wider range of cases. We address this point below.
5.2 The General Case
Since the reallocation e⁄ect always dominates under logarithmic preferences, a convenient
strategy to discuss the implications of ￿ 6= 1 is to search for conditions under which the
8Notice that (46) is also implied by (31), which establishes that  
F > 0 requires ￿ < ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿) < ￿￿.
14opposite result holds - that is, seek situations where the rent-e⁄ect dominates. When ￿ 6= 1,
the propensities to consume and to invest in the laissez-faire economy are determined by (25)-
(26). In particular, as shown in (31), the existence of a well-de￿ned equilibrium with a positive
investment rate is linked to the feasibility condition ￿=￿ < ￿ (1 ￿ ￿). Now consider the ratio
between intermediate quantities (41), and focus on the case in which the rent-e⁄ect dominates
the reallocation e⁄ect. From (41), we have x? (t) > xF (t) if and only if the term in square
brackets is greater than unity - that is, if and only if parameters satisfy ￿=￿ > 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿.
Combining these two inequalities, it follows that a necessary condition for a well-de￿ned
laissez-faire equilibrium with xF < x? to exist is
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿ < ￿=￿ < ￿ (1 ￿ ￿): (49)
It is easy to show that (49) generalizes our previous ￿ndings with logarithmic preferences.9
More importantly, (49) allows us to de￿ne a two-sided necessary condition for obtaining a
dominant rent-e⁄ect:
Proposition 4 Necessary conditions for a well-de￿ned laissez-faire equilibrium with ine¢ -
ciently low production of intermediates (xF (t) < x? (t)) to exist are
￿ > 1 +
￿2
1 ￿ ￿








As a consequence, the reallocation e⁄ect surely dominates in any laissez-faire equilibrium with
￿ 6 1.
Both (50) and (51) are necessary conditions for obtaining xF (t) < x? (t). Clearly, condition
(50) cannot be satis￿ed when ￿ 6 1. Hence, if a well-de￿ned laissez-faire equilibrium exists
with ￿ 6 1, the reallocation e⁄ect dominates and the optimal policy consists of taxing ￿nal
producers. When ￿ > 1, instead, a laissez-faire equilibrium with xF (t) < x? (t) may exist.
The case in which the rent-e⁄ect dominates is restricted by both inequalities (50)-(51), and
represents situations in which intermediates￿production is ine¢ ciently low under competitive
conditions, and ￿nal producers should be subsidized.
The general message of Proposition 4 is that, as ￿ increases, the equilibrium quantity of
intermediates under laissez-faire xF (t) converges from above to (and eventually falls short
of) the optimal quantity x? (t). The economic intuition for this result is that the reallocation
e⁄ect is weaker the higher is ￿. In fact, ￿ determines whether, in response to a variation
in the interest rate, consumers are more willing to smooth the consumption pro￿le or to
postpone consumption. When ￿ < 1, the reallocation e⁄ect is stronger: if agents knew that
the productivity of R&D investment were higher than the level perceived by atomistic ￿rms,
they would decide to invest more into R&D activity, and the additional investment would be
relatively high because ￿ < 1 implies that the willingness to postpone consumption overcomes
the willingness to smooth the consumption pro￿le. This explains why, in the case ￿ < 1, a
9In the logarithmic case, condition (49) is not satis￿ed. In fact, setting ￿ = 1, condition (49) reduces
to ￿ < ￿=￿ < ￿ (1 ￿ ￿). This condition cannot be satis￿ed since ￿ > ￿ (1 ￿ ￿). Hence, in the logarithmic




15benevolent planner would unambiguously choose to tax ￿nal producers and devote more and
more resources to R&D. When ￿ > 1, instead, the reallocation e⁄ect arising in the laissez-
faire economy is weaker: if agents knew the true rate of return they would still adjust savings
and invest more into R&D activity, but the additional investment would be relatively limited
because ￿ > 1 implies that the willingness to smooth the consumption pro￿le dominates
the willingness to postpone consumption. Given that the reallocation e⁄ect is weaker when
￿ > 1, it is possible that the rent-e⁄ect dominates - i.e. that the equilibrium quantity of
intermediates falls short of the optimal one. If this is the case, the optimal policy is similar
to the one predicted by the MS-model, i.e. subsidizing ￿nal producers, although the optimal
subsidy rate is still reduced by the reallocation e⁄ect - which does not exist in the MS-model.
The above interpretation is con￿rmed by the fact that the optimal policy consists of impos-
ing a lower tax rate (i.e. a higher subsidy rate) on ￿nal producers the higher is ￿. Imposing
the equality between the equilibrium input quantity after public intervention, xE, and the
optimal quantity x?, equations (24) and (40) yield the optimal subsidy rate
b￿ = ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿￿
: (52)
The derivative @b￿=@￿ = ￿￿￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)
￿2 > 0 con￿rms that the optimal subsidy
(tax) rate is increasing (decreasing) in ￿. As regards the optimal subsidy to R&D activity, a￿,
results do not change with respect to the case of logarithmic preferences: imposing the equality
between the equilibrium growth rate after public intervention, _ Y E=Y E, and the optimal growth
rate _ Y ?=Y ?, equations (22) and (37) yield again expression (48) in Proposition 3.
6 Conclusion
An established result of the endogenous growth literature is that the competitive equilibria
arising in expanding-varieties models are sub-optimal due to the rent-e⁄ect: in order to obtain
a positive mark-up, monopolists restrict the supply of intermediate inputs; consequently, the
equilibrium quantity of each intermediate is ine¢ ciently low. The policy implication is that
￿nal producers should be subsidized in order to restore e¢ ciency. This result holds in multi-
sector models displaying scale e⁄ects, where the instantaneous increase in the number of
varieties is proportional to the absolute level of R&D expenditures. It is known that scale
e⁄ects can be eliminated by postulating a di⁄erent dynamic law, whereby the growth rate of
intermediates￿varieties is proportional to the investment propensity. This paper has shown
that an additional consequence of assuming the linear-rate law is that the optimal subsidy to
￿nal producers becomes strictly negative in a wide range of cases. The reason is that linear-
rate laws can be reconciled with zero-pro￿ts in the R&D sectors by assuming spillovers from
past innovations, but this assumption substantially alters the welfare properties of competitive
equilibria. Under laissez-faire, the economy under-invests into R&D activity because agents
fail to internalize research spillovers. Since under-investment in R&D implies greater shares
of output devoted to consumption and to the production of intermediates, the equilibrium
quantity of intermediate inputs is a⁄ected by two opposing forces: it tends to be reduced
by monopolistic pricing but, at the same time, tends to be increased by the misallocation
of resources in disfavor of R&D activity. Di⁄erently from the standard multi-sector model
with scale e⁄ects, the equilibrium quantity of each di⁄erentiated input under laissez-faire
16may be higher or lower than in the optimum: if the reallocation e⁄ect dominates the rent-
e⁄ect, there is overshooting in intermediates￿production. Clearly, if this is the case, the policy
prescription is reversed: the decentralization of the the social optimum requires ￿nal producers
to be taxed, instead of being subsidized. The interesting result is that the reallocation e⁄ect
surely dominates in the polar case of logarithmic preferences, as well as in all cases in which
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1=￿, is above unity. When ￿ ￿ 1, the overshooting
result is reinforced and the optimal tax on ￿nal producers is strictly positive. When ￿ > 1,
instead, it possible that the elasticity of substitution overcomes a critical threshold whereby the
reallocation e⁄ect is weakened and dominated by the rent-e⁄ect. In this case, intermediates￿
production is ine¢ ciently low and the ￿nal sector should be subsidized - although the optimal
subsidy rate will be generally smaller than that predicted by the MS-model.
Appendix
The Household Problem. The current-value Hamiltonian associated to the household
problem is
H = u(c) + ￿[(i ￿ ‘)n + w ￿ c ￿ f];
where ￿ is the dynamic multiplier associated to (12). The ￿rst-order conditions Hc = 0
and Hn = ￿￿ ￿ _ ￿ yield uc = ￿ and _ ￿=￿ = ￿ + ‘ ￿ i, from which _ c=c = ￿￿1 (i ￿ ￿ ￿ ‘).
Plugging _ ￿=￿ = ￿ + ‘ ￿ i in the transversality condition limv!1 ￿(v)n(v)e￿￿(v￿t) we obtain
limv!1 n(v)e￿
R v
t (i(s)￿‘)ds = 0. Substituting n(v) = N (v)=L(v), and L(v) = L(t)e‘(v￿t)
together with N (t) = J (t)V (t), we obtain limv!1 J (v)V (v)e￿
R v
t i(s)ds = 0 for any ￿nite
t ￿ 0, which implies (14).
Derivation of (16). Substituting n(t) = J (t)V (t)=L(t) in (12) we obtain
_ J (t)V (t) + _ V (t)J (t) = i(t)J (t)V (t) + w(t)L(t) ￿ C (t) ￿ f (t)L(t)
where C (t) ￿ L(t)c(t) is aggregate consumption. Plugging _ J (t) = ￿(t)Z (t) from (8),
V (t) = 1=[￿(t)(1 + a)] from (9), and _ V (t) = i(t)V (t) ￿ ￿ (t) from (10), we obtain
Z (t)(1 + a)
￿1 = w(t)L(t) + J (t)￿ (t) ￿ C (t) ￿ f (t)L(t);
Substituting ￿ (t) = p(t)x(t) ￿ ￿x(t) and recalling that (2)-(3) imply Y (t) + bJ (t)x(t) =
L(t)w(t) + p(t)J (t)x(t), we obtain
Z (t)(1 + a)
￿1 = Y (t) ￿ J (t)￿x(t) ￿ C (t) + bJ (t)x(t) ￿ f (t)L:
Substituting bJ (t)x(t) ￿ f (t)L(t) = ￿az (t) from the government budget (11) and recalling
that z (t)(1 + a) = Z (t), we obtain the aggregate budget constraint (16).
17Proof of Proposition 1. First notice that the equilibrium relations imply10
J (t)x(t)
Y (t)
















Next consider (10): substituting ￿ (t) from (6) and V (t) = [￿(t)(1 + a)]
￿1 = Y (t)=[￿(1 + a)J (t)]
from (9) and (17), and using (A1) to eliminate J (t)x(t)=Y (t), we have




From (9) and (17), we have _ V =V = ( _ Y =Y ) ￿ ( _ J=J), and from (A3) this implies _ V =V = ‘.
Expression (A4) thus yields result (21). Setting the consumption propensity ￿ ￿ C=Y and
the investment rate   ￿ Z=Y , equation (A2) reads   (t) = 1 ￿ ￿(t) ￿ ￿
￿￿b￿2. Plugging this
result in (18) yields
_ J (t)=J (t) = ￿  (t) = ￿
￿






which, combined with (A3), implies
_ Y (t)=Y (t) = ‘ + ￿
￿






From (15) and (21), consumption growth equals
_ C (t)=C (t) = ‘ +
1
￿
[￿(1 + a)￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿]: (A7)
From (A6)-(A7), the equilibrium growth rate of the consumption propensity _ ￿=￿ = ( _ C=C) ￿
( _ Y =Y ) must satisfy
_ ￿(t)=￿(t) = ￿￿(t) +
1
￿








This dynamic relation has a unique ￿xed point






[(1 + a)￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿=￿)]: (A9)
which is dynamically unstable. Since ￿(t) 6= ￿ss at any t would generate explosive dynamics
￿(t) ! ￿1 implying the violation in ￿nite time of either the aggregate constraint (16) or of
the non-negativity of consumption, the only equilibrium satisfying(A8) is ￿E (t) = ￿ss in each
10Equation (A1) follows from (5) and (7). Plugging (A1) in (16) yields (A2). Time-di⁄erentiation of (7)
implies (A3).
18t 2 [0;1) - which proves (19). Since ￿E (t) = ￿ss in each t 2 [0;1), the investment rate is
constant as well: from (A2) we obtain   (t) equal to
 E = 1 ￿
￿
￿ ￿ b
￿2 ￿ ￿E =
1
￿
[(1 + a)￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿=￿)] (A10)
in each t 2 [0;1). From (A1), (A2) and (16), constant propensities to consume and to invest
imply that Y E (t) grows at the same rate as CE (t) and ZE (t), given by the Keynes-Ramsey
rule (A7), which proves result (22). Expression (23) can be equivalently obtained from (A3)
or (A5). ￿
Proof of Proposition 2. The Hamiltonian associated to the social problem is
H0 = Lu(c) + ￿
￿










where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the static constraint (33),11 and ￿ is the
dynamic multiplier associated to the dynamic constraint (34). Notice that the ￿rst-order
conditions with respect to each x(j) read
￿ (1 ￿  )L1￿￿x(j)
￿￿1 = ￿ (A11)
for each j 2 [0;J], which implies symmetry across varieties. As a consequence, the maximiza-
tion is equivalently carried over by imposing symmetry ex-ante - that is, setting x(j) = x for
each j 2 [0;J] in each instant, and using the modi￿ed Hamiltonian
H00 = Lu(c) + ￿
￿
(1 ￿  )L1￿￿Jx￿ ￿ ￿Jx ￿ Lc
￿
+ ￿J￿ ;
where the control variables are (c;x; ), and the ￿rst-order condition with respect to x will
incorporate (A11) for each j 2 [0;J]. The necessary conditions for optimality read
H00
c = 0 ! uc (t) = ￿(t); (A12)
H00
x = 0 ! ￿ (1 ￿   (t))Y (t) = ￿J (t)x(t); (A13)
H00
  = 0 ! ￿(t)Y (t) = ￿(t)J (t)￿; (A14)
together with the co-state equation H00
J = ￿￿ ￿ _ ￿, which implies
￿(t)(1 ￿   (t))(Y (t)=J (t)) + ￿(t)￿  (t) = (￿ + ‘)￿(t) ￿ _ ￿(t): (A15)
Plugging (A13) in the aggregate constraint (16), and using the de￿nitions ￿(t) ￿ C (t)=Y (t)
and   (t) ￿ Z (t)=Y (t), we obtain
￿(t) = (1 ￿   (t))(1 ￿ ￿): (A16)
11An equivalent speci￿cation consists of eliminating ￿ by plugging constraint (33) directly into the instanta-
neous utility function as u(c) = u
nh
(1 ￿  )L
1￿￿ R J
0 x(j)
￿ dj ￿ ￿
R J




. Obviously, results do
not change.
19Plugging (A16) back in (A13), we have
￿











Since Y = L1￿￿Jx￿ implies _ Y =Y = (1 ￿ ￿)‘ + ( _ J=J) + ￿ (_ x=x), we can substitute _ x=x =
￿￿1
h
( _ Y =Y ) ￿ ( _ J=J) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)‘
i






+ (1 ￿ ￿)
_ J (t)
J (t)
+ (1 ￿ ￿)‘: (A18)
which is useful for future reference. Using (A12) to eliminate ￿(t) from (A14) and (A15), we
respectively obtain
uc (t)Y (t) = ￿(t)J (t)￿; (A19)
_ ￿(t)=￿(t) = ￿ + ‘ ￿ ￿: (A20)















Substituting _ c=c = ( _ C=C) ￿ ‘ and using (A18) to eliminate _ Y =Y from (A21), we get
_ C (t)
C (t)
(￿ ￿ ￿) = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ‘ ￿ ￿
_ J (t)
J (t)
+ (1 ￿ ￿ + ￿)‘: (A22)
Equation (A22) implies two possible cases, depending on whether ￿ = ￿ or ￿ 6= ￿. We proceed
with the more general case ￿ 6= ￿, and we later verify that the same results hold in the special







































where we can substitute the left hand side with _ ￿=￿, and _ J=J = ￿  = ￿
h
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿1
i
from (34) and (A16), to obtain
_ ￿(t)=￿(t) =










[￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]; (A26)
which is well de￿ned if and only if
￿ > ￿(1 ￿ ￿): (A27)
Notice that (A27) also implies the further restriction ￿ > ￿, since otherwise (A25) would
display negative denominators in both terms of the right hand side and no ￿xed point ￿ ￿ > 0
could thus be de￿ned. Given ￿ > ￿, relation (A25) is dynamically unstable, and can only be
satis￿ed by setting ￿? (t) = ￿ ￿ in each t 2 [0;1), which proves (35). From (35) and (A16),
we obtain (36). Plugging (36) in (34), we have (38). A constant ￿? (t) implies _ C=C = _ Y =Y
in (A18), and therefore _ Y (t)=Y (t) = _ J (t)=J (t) + ‘, where we can substitute (38) to obtain
(37). All these results are con￿rmed in the special case ￿ = ￿. In fact, when ￿ = ￿, result
(A22) implies a constant growth rate of J (t), given by (37). From the accumulation law (34),
the investment rate is constant and given by (36), and the consumption propensity implied
by (A16) is given by (36). ￿
Derivation of (40). From (A13), the optimal quantity of each intermediate product is
determined by
x? (t) =










Solving for x? (t) and substituting  ? = 1
￿￿ (￿ ￿ ￿) from (36), we obtain (40).
Proof of Proposition 3. In order to obtain an optimal quantity of intermediate inputs,
the ￿scal authority must set the subsidy rate to ￿nal producers, b, in order to make xE (t)
coinciding with x? (t). From (24) and (40), having xE (t) = x? (t) in each t requires setting
b = b￿ = ￿
￿￿￿￿
￿ , which is strictly negative from (46). In order to decentralize the optimal
growth rate and the optimal propensities to invest and consume, ￿scal authorities set a = a￿
in order to equalize the growth rates _ Y E=Y E = _ Y ?=Y ?. From (22) and (37), we obtain
1 + a￿ = [￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
￿1. Since a = a￿ also implies an optimal rate of return as well as optimal
propensities to invest and consume in the competitive economy, i.e. ￿E = ￿? and  E =  ?,
the optimal policy consists of a = a￿ and b = b￿, with f￿ (t) = (1=L(t))[a￿z (t) + b￿J (t)x(t)]
determined by the government budget constraint (11). ￿
Proof of Proposition 4. In order to satisfy (49), a ￿rst necessary condition is that the
￿rst term is strictly less than the third term, 1￿￿ +￿￿ < ￿ (1 ￿ ￿). Rearranging terms, this
condition can be re-written as in (50). A second necessary condition to satisfy (49) is the ￿rst
inequality, 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿ < ￿=￿, which can be re-written as in (51). ￿
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